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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BARBARA ANN PAINTER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

BRlIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.
JAMES RANDALL PAINTER,
CiVil No. 870317-CA
Defendant-Appellant.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3g (1987).

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The
(hereinafter

Plaintiff-Respondent,
"Plaintiff") ,

Defendant-Appellant,

James

filed

Barbara
a

Randall

C|omplaint
Painter

Ann

Painter

against

the

(hereinafter

"Defendant"), seeking a divorce (R. 105). The Defendant filed
an Answer and Counterclaim (R. 20-23, 20^-209).
This appeal is from an order, entered in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Juab County on the 25th of June,
1987, granting to the Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce from the
Defendant (R. 283-287).

Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal as

directed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the 23rd of
July, 1987 (R. 290-291).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

are

and

have

been

residents of Juab County, State of Utah, for a period in excess
of three months prior to filing this action.
2.

The parties were married

each to the other on

April 23, 1968 in Nephi, Utah and separated in March of 1986.
3.

There have been born as issue of this marriage

four minor children, to wit; Aaron Painter, Mario Painter,
Benjamin Painter, and MeLea Painter
4.

Plaintiff was awarded custody and control of the

two youngest children of the parties and joint custody of the
two older boys.
5.

Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded joint custody

of Aaron and Mario with the principal place of residence being
with Plaintiff.

Aaron and Mario to live six months of the year

with Defendant so long as both parties continue to reside in
Nephi, Utah.

Should either party move from Nephi, Utah then in

such event the Plaintiff shall have the custody of Aaron and
Mario.
6.

Defendant is an able-bodied person and is employed

by Painter Motor Company and earns in excess of $2,000 per
month.
7.

Plaintiff is employed on a part-time basis and

earns approximately $200 per month.

-2-

8.
rate

of

Defendant was ordered to pay child support at the

$160

Plaintiff's

per

care

month

and

per

child

custody.

paying the child support

for

the

Defendant

was

children
excused

in
from

for Aaron and Mario during the six

months he has them in his custody.
9.

Defendant

is able to provide health and accident

insurance on the minor children and he Vas ordered to maintain
the same.
10.

Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the sum of $450

per month.
11.

Defendant

was

to

pay

all

of

the

obligations

incurred during the marriage except that obligation due or to
become due on the mortgage on the family home.
12.

Each

party

was

awarded

on^-half

of

the present

equity in the family home.
13.

The

Painter

Family

LimitecJ

Partnership

and

the

Painter Motor Company stock interest was awarded to Defendant.
14.

The

motorcycles

used

by

the

children

of

the

parties were awarded to the children.
15.

The Court entered a restraining order dated March

18, 1986 which restrained both parties from "disposing of any
of the real property, personal property# business property or
investment property, money or funds belonging to the parties .
. ."

Defendant has violated the terms ok that order by making

payment

to

Zions

First

National

-3-

Banl^

in

the

amount

of

$15f460.27 in payment of a business loan; a payment to Painter
Motor of $3,085.08 for a pay advance; a payment in the amount
of $1,622.48 to Painter Motor Insurance; a payment to First
Security

Bank

motorcycles

of

in

$1,589.87

the

appropriately

made

Commission.

The

and

amount

payments
parties

of
to

had

the

purchase

$2,456.28.
IRS

and

accumulated

of

Honda

Defendant

the

State

$36,688

Tax
in

a

retirement

fund

from which Defendant made the unauthorized

payments.

There should have been $32,950.59 remaining in the

account.

Plaintiff should be entitled to $16,475.30 of the

retirement account.

There remains $8,736.51 of these funds.

Plaintiff was therefore awarded the $8,736.51 in cash remaining
from the retirement account and the lot valued at $7,000 to
compensate her for the unauthorized expenditures.
16.

The

remaining

lot valued

at

$6,000 was to be

placed for sale immediately and the proceeds therefrom divided
equally.
17.

The

1983

Riviera

automobile

was

awarded

to

Plaintiff, and Defendant was required to make whatever payment
arrangements were necessary with Painter Motor Company in order
to secure clear title to the Plaintiff.
18.

The household furnishings were divided equally by

the parties.
19.

It was apparent from the testimony and evidence

presented at trial that the Defendant has substantial income

-4-

benefits other than those reported td the Internal Revenue
Service for tax purposes.

The Court has taken into account

that disparity in making its findings and the property division
and further in making the support provisions as herein set
forth.

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
i

Point I
The

Trial

Court

considered

all

of

the

evidence

including the debts, the assets, and the respective earning
capacities of the parties in making ar equitable division of
property and in the award of alimony anc child support.
The Defendant

simply

reargues his position at the

Trial Court level which position was Appropriately rejected.
Defendant's entire testimony is suspect because of inconsistent
statements.

His testimony is unbelievable and was rejected in

part by the Trial Court.

No substantiation exists to support:

a.

The "Zions loan" of $15,460;

b.

The requirement to repav "advances" to Painter

Motor Co.;
c.

The

requirement

to

repay

the

"Painter

Insurance Loan."
Yet extensive evidence exists disclosing Defendant's
earnings beyond that stated under oath.

The convenient use of

Painter Motor Co. as an "alter-ego" whenever it is and was to
the advantage of Defendant.
-5-

Point II
There was an equitable distribution of the marital
assets.

An examination of the total marital estate and its

distribution

discloses

that

each

party

approximately

one-half.

There

is a decided

was

awarded

distortion in

Defendant's favor if the Limited Partnership and Painter Motor
stock interest are deemed marital assets.

Only in the mind of

Defendant is there any disparity.
Point III
The Trial Court looked beyond "parental pressures" on
both sides and simply interviewed the two oldest children out
of the presence of the parties and counsel.

These interviews,

together with the evidence submitted by the respective parties,
formed the basis of the custodial order.

No one has been

deprived of any "due process of law."
Point IV
The free interchange of the assets of Painter Motor
and

the parties

distribution

of

failed

to mislead

equal

parts

of

the Trial
the

marital

Court.
estate

The
is

appropriate and sustainable.
Point V
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees and
costs in defending this Appeal.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE DEBTSr
ASSETS, AND RESPECTIVE EARNING RAPACITIES OF
THE PARTIES.
The

scope

of

review

by

th£

Appellate

Court

is

succinctly stated in Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986)
wherein the Supreme Court declared at page 780:
The
long-recognized
and
oft-repeated
standard of appellate review permits this
Court to overturn the judgment of the trial
court
only when the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or the trial
court
has
abused
its
discretion
or
misapplied principles of law. In adjusting
the financial and property interest of
parties to divorce, the trial court is
afforded considerable discretion, and its
actions are cloaked with a presumption of
validity (citations omitted).
The Defendant

has

failed

to

show

or

even

allude

to any

preponderance of evidence contrary to the Court's ruling or
that the Trial Court abused its discretion.
The Trial Court specifically f^und in its Memorandum
Decision, paragraph 8:
It is apparent from the testimony and
evidence presented
at trial that the
defendant has substantial income benefits
other than those reported to Ithe Internal
Revenue Service for tax purposes. The court
has taken into account that disparity in
making the above-mentioned property division
and further in making the support provisions
as set forth above.
The

evidence

elicited

at

trial

consists

in

part

of

the

unrebutted testimony of Plaintiff in the following specifics:
-7-

Q: How did you handle the financial
matters during the term of your marriage
before the separation?
A: He would give me his check and I
would deposit the entire check into my
checking account and then it was my job to
take care of all the household expenses and
take care of the needs of the children and
myself.
Q: Now in addition to those items did
Mr. Painter have other monies with which to
utilize and benefit the family with?
A:

Yes.

Q: What were some of
would do during this time?
A:

the

things

he

He went on many trips.

Q: Did he ever ask you for funds for
those trips?
A:

No, never.

Q: As I understand it, you told us his
total check would be given to you, is that
correct?
A:

Yes.

Q: Did he take the family out for
dinners
and
that
sort
of
thing
from
time-to-time?
A: Yes, the last two years he has
taken
us
to
—
well,
we
ate
out
approximately twice a week either to a
drive-in or the restaurant and he took us to
Orem shopping and to movies and to dinners.
Q: Did he ever ask you for money for
that period?
A:

No.
* * *

-8-

Q:
A:
1985.

What does Exhibit 8 purport to be?
Monthly

household

expenses

for

Q: Now why did you choose the year '85
as opposed to any other period?
A: I felt that it gave a more true
picture of how we were living, what style we
were living on.
1986 was the year that my
husband left home and my income dropped
considerably for half of that year.
An examination of Exhibit
$2f013 per month.

8 discloses actual expenditures

When cross examined at pages 335 and 336

the record, Plaintiff responded:
Q: What was Mr. Painter ie ^otal check
that you received every month?
It was $1,543.00.
That was the net check, correct?
Yes.
How big was your check^
It varied.
The most
it ever was was in
approximately the $200 range, is that true?
A: That is probably tru£.
have to look at this tax form.

I would

Q: So the money that you had at your
disposal, his check of fifteen hundred and
two hundred you applied toward the monthly
living expenses?
A:

Yes.

Q: Do you have any explanation why you
list down total expenses are $2,013 and he
only gave you fifteen and you had an
additional two?

-9-

A:
cash.

Yes, I can explain.

Q:

He gave me

How often did he do that?

A: Quite frequently, and he paid for
the childrens1 school lunch and any expenses
that they might have, such as golf lessons
and going to the 7-Eleven stores, things
like that. They would ask their dad for the
money and he would give them cash.
Defendant is an officer, director and key employee of
Painter

Motor.

He historically

has

received

a number of

"benefits" which have been available to other key employees and
family members.
The

parties1

separation.
Defendant

lifestyle

had

not

changed

until

the

From the date of separation, the lifestyle of

was

increased

and

all

the while Defendant

paid

support to Plaintiff and the children in the amount of $444 per
month and the house payment of $335.

Defendant's business

activities above and beyond his "$2,000 salary" over a period
of fifteen months of separation allowed him to do the otherwise
impossible.
Defendant
month.

asserts his take-home pay

is $1,543 per

From that amount he paid the following:
a.

$444 to Plaintiff per month for a total of

$6,660;
b.

$335 house payment for a total of $5,360;

c.

Purchased motorcycles costing $5,100 (R. 376);

d.

Paid his own living expenses;
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e.

Traveled with his song a total of not less

than 56 days on the "racing circuit."
f.

An analysis of Exhibits 21 and 30 disclose:
1.

June '86 expenditures for racing $739;

2.

July '86 expenditures for racing $662;

3.

March '87 expenditures for racing $482;

for an average per month of $6^7 or a total of $9,405
for racing activities.
Defendant
separation.

had

a

total

of

$23,145

Itake-home

pay

during

He paid out:
a.

Support

$ 6,660

b.

House payments

5,360

c.

Motorcycle purchases

5,100

d.

Travel and circuit expenses

9,405

Total

$26,525

Plus he paid his own living expenses.
his deposition

that his monthly

defendant testified in

living

expenses were $700

(Deposition, page 90), and at trial he testified of $1,205 per
month

(R. 395-396).

If his expenses were $700 for the 15

months, it would equal $10,500. If the figure of $10,500 is
utilized in the living expenses, Defendant somehow managed to
pay total expenses of $37,025 with $23,14fe earnings.

There was

no testimony of any liabilities except thfe Mastercard statement
of $1,200 (Exhibit 30).
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Defendant did admit in testimony that he had expended
some

$lf800

to

$2f000

on

racing

activities.

There

is

documented evidence of June and July of 1986 and March of 1987
which totals $1,883.

If one uses only "hard" figures of:

a.

Support payments of

$ 6f660

b.

House payments of

c.

Defendant's living expenses

d.

Motorcycle purchases

5,100

e.

Racing expenses

1,883

5f025
10f500

$29,168
The

credibility

Defendant

of

testified

deposition

Defendant

is

stretched

at

of

the

length

racing

beyond
trips

belief.
in

his

(pages 76-82) and failed to rebut the testimony of

Plaintiff contained in Exhibit 15 detailing 56 days of trips.
The Defendant

did testify he had limited amounts of

income from "incentives" and the sale of "old junk cars."

He

testified

as

about

this

income

at

page

379

of

the

follows:
Q: He made
automobiles?
A:

Yes.

reference

to

some

junk

That is correct.
* * *

A: In different intervals,
on how many we have, we will
salvage off.
Q:

And your total amount?

-12-

depending
sell the

record

A: There was a total of five hundred
[dollars] of which I got one-third of it. I
have two other brothers that participate on
that.
Q: About
the
incentives
that
you
receive from the automobile dealership, are
those reflected in your tax returns?
A: If they exceed $650, I believe, I
will receive a W-2 form.
The foregoing analysis highlights a rule of law which
is

succinctly

stated

in

81 Am.

Jur. 2d Witnesses

§ 669 as

follows:
There is a general principle of law that
where a witness has testified falsely to
some material
matter
in
a case, his
testimony
in
other
respects
may
be
disregarded unless it is corroborated by
other proof.
This legal principle is
expressed in the common-law maxi[m "falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus," . . .
Utah has followed this rule.
2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115.
first

hand

observance

See Gritt^ns v. Lundberg, 3 Ut.

The Trial Courts as trier of fact had
of

Defendant's credibility.

the demeanor

of Defendant

and the

It is obvious that the Trial Court

has an advantaged position to hear and observe Defendant.

The

Supreme Court

219

in Smith v. Cent. Credit

Union, 727 P.2d

(Utah 1986) declared at pages 220 and 221|:
When an appellant challenges thk failure of
the trier of fact to accept his version of
the facts, our review is strictly limited.
We view the evidence and its inferences in a
light most favorable to the judgment and
findings.
They will not be disturbed when

-13-

based upon substantial competent, admissible
evidence. . . . When the evidence conflicts,
we necessarily give deference to the fact
finder and acknowledge his advantageous
position
vis-a-vis
the witnesses, the
evidence,
and
the
parties.
Accordingly,
because
the
evidence
is
sufficient to support the determination of
the court below, we do not undertake to
reweigh the evidence or redetermine the
facts (citations omitted).
Defendant further testified about his debts (R. 396)
in which there were two obligations.
other to Painter Motor Co.

One to Mastercard and the

Mr. Painter testified about a loan

application, Exhibit 22, which bears his signature.
asserted

that

it

was

signed

in

blank.

Defendant

However,

when

questioned, he admitted he gave information orally over the
telephone to have it "filled in."

At page 351 of the record,

Defendant testified:
Q: Do you normally fill
statements of that nature, sir?

out

blank

A: Yes, when I am dealing with people
that I trust.
Q: I see. Did you give to the First
Security Bank various information about what
to put on Exhibit 22?
A: Some of the information was done
over the telephone.
They needed some
figures to fill in the blanks so it would
pass in case there was an audit apparently.
An examination of Exhibit 22, which is dated February 20, 1986,
discloses that Defendant had cash of $25,000 and no debts. Yet
later in his testimony, Defendant attempts to get the Court to

-14-

believe that a "loan to Zions" existed i^i June 1986.
testified on direct at page 391:
Q: There is an amount lifted to Zions
Bank for $15,460.27. What was that for?
A: That was a loan
fjor a stock
purchase on a joint venture with two of my
other brothers in the futurejs market in
silver and sugar.
On cross examination, Defendant admittedt
Q: I understand, sir, thdt on Exhibit
29 you've indicated that you have expended
$15,460 to Zions for a loan, is that
correct?
A:

That is in payment of a loan, yes.

Q:

Is your

A:

No, she was not.

wife

a signaltor

to

that

loan?

Q: Did she have any involjvement about
that loan?
A:

No. . . •

Q: Have
you
given
documentation about that loan?
A: She
with it.

never

wanted

to

her
oe

any

involved

Q: That wasn't my question whether she
wanted to be involved. Did you tfive her any
documentation?
A: The only thing she seen was the
statement that come from the bpnk and she
handed that to me when it come.
Q: Did you ever say we are|indebted to
Zions Bank for $15,500?
A:

No, I did not.

-15-

Defendant

Q:
Zions?

Do you have copies of the loan with

A:

I

think

you

have

the

copies

of

Q:

Well, I will tell you I don't have.

them*

A: I don't
course I don't.

have

them

with

me.

Of

If the loan was a joint venture with Defendant's two brothers,
why should the marital estate be responsible to repay the whole
obligation of the joint venture?

No documentation about the

loan has ever been produced.

All we have is the unverified

testimony

of

of

the

Defendant

its

existence

which

is

contradicted by his own statements.
An analysis of the tax returns, Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4,
discloses that the Defendant earned more than $2,000 gross per
month.

Yet in his deposition, he testified:
Q:

How much is that salary now?

A:

2,000 per month.

Q: Has it ever been more or less than
that in the last three years?
A:

It's never been more.

On cross examination when Defendant asserted he was required to
repay the "advances" from Painter Motor, he testified at pages
399 and 400:
Q: You indicated, sir, the Painter
Motor pay back advances, is that correct,
for some $3,000?
A:

That is correct.

-16-

Q: And that is because thby supposedly
overpaid you more than $2f000 per month that
was your salaryf is that correct?
A: The way that advance worked is I
was on commission up to a certain time and I
had drawn more than my commissions equaled
and so I had an obligation to piy that back.
Q:
returns
amount?

But isn't it true that your tax
reflect on your W-21 the total

A: The tax return
amount, that is right.

show

the

total

* * *

Q: Do you recall in your deposition I
asked you if there was ever any written
request for a so-called payment back?
A: There wasn't
There was a statement.

a

written

request.

Q: So there has not been any written
requests at all have there?
Tfye W-2 forms
on your tax returns, which appears as
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, all indicate that that
was not an advance, but actual compensation,
isn't that accurate?
A:

I don't know if that is accurate or

not.
In
evidence

which

substantial
returns.

summaryf

there

supports

is
the

earnings beyond that
Since Defendant

creditable
Trial

and

Court's

admissible
finding

of

reflected in the income tax

failed to conle forward with these

earnings, then the "business loans" admittedly not disclosed to
Plaintiff cannot be a "marital debt."

-17-

Assuming arguendo, that the "Zions loan," the Painter
Motor "advance," and "insurance loan" are marital debts, there
is no showing under the evidence in the Trial Court that the
Trial

Court

abused

its discretion

in light of the actual

distribution to the parties as detailed hereinafter.

POINT II
THE CODRT AWARDED THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
AND PAINTER MOTOR STOCK INTERESTS TO
DEFENDANT.
There is no showing in the evidence that the Court did not
consider the Limited Partnership interest and the Painter Motor
stock

interest

as

the

separate

property

of

Defendant*

Defendant was awarded the same.
The assets and liabilities of the marriage may be
summarized as follows:
Assets

Liabilities

Home
$
*Retirement Plan
Lot Next Door
Nebo Lot
Household Furnishings
(No value established)
1983 Riviera Auto
(No value established)
Limited Partnership
Interest
Painter Motor Stock
TOTAL ASSETS

76,000
32,950
7,000
6,000

Mortgage
$24,409
Mastercard to Defendant 1,200
Money Borrowed by
2,640
Plaintiff

19,960
6,900

$151,810

TOTAL LIABILITIES

Plaintiff received:
a*
b.

1/2 of equity in Home
$25,795
Cash from Retirement Account
8,736
-18-

$28,249

c.
d.
e.
f.

7,000
3,000

Lot
1/2 of Nebo lot
1/2 of Furniture
Riviera Automobile

unknown

Total to Plaintiff

$44 ,531

-0-

Defendant received:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

1/2 of equity in Home
$25,795
1/2 of Nebo lot
3,000
Limited Partnership
19,960
The Painter Motor Stock
6f900
1/2 of Furniture
-0Already received from Pension
Plan
$15,460 to Zions
3,085 to Painter Motor
1,622 to Painter f^otor
$20,167
20,167
Total to Defendant

$75,822

^Retirement
Plan
was
originally
$36,886.
The
Court
appropriately allowed offsets of IRS and State tax obligations
totaling $3,936 for a net of $32,950.
There was no direction about the relativ^ minor liabilities of
each party, but Plaintiff was to pay the mortgage.
When
respective

one

examines

parties

and

the

the

actual

Trial

distribution

Court's

to

prerogative

the
to

disbelieve the Defendant in his testimony, the distribution is
in Defendant's favor.
Defendant
Trial

for

Court

There can be no argument of penalty to

the violation
simply

of

rectified

the

the

restraining

wrongful

order.

disbursements

The
of

Defendant of the retirement funds.
Finally,
Limited

if the distribution

Partnership

and

Painter
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id examined

Motor

stock

as if the

interests

are

Defendant's separate property, it becomes even clearer that the
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion.
Awarded to Plaintiff
Equity in Home
Cash on Hand
Lot
Nebo Lot
Riviera

Awarded to Defendant

$25,795
8,736
7,000
3,000
unknown

TOTAL
the

value

of

$25,795

Equity in Home
Disbursements from
Retirement Plan
Nebo Lot

$44,531
If

To illustrates

20,167
3,000
$48,962

TOTAL
the

Plainti ff's

Riviera

is

approximately $4,431, the ledgers are absolutely equal.

POINT III
THE CUSTODY ORDER IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
DOES NOT VIOLATE DDE PROCESS.
The

Plaintiff

testified

about

her

abilities

custodial parent as follows at pages 317 and 318:
Q: What kind of family activities do
you and your children engage in by way of
recreation or otherwise?
A: Well, lately I have been going to
some of the weekend races with them. They
race motorcycles. And through the years for
entertainment we have gone camping with my
family a lot, and I take them on picnics or
to the park. I have taken them up north,
oh, skating and to movies, swimming.
Q: And what kind of relationship would
you describe you have with your children at
the present time?
A: I have
with them.

an excellent

relationship

Q: Have you followed their schooling
activities
and
that
sort
of
thing
historically through the marriage.
-20-

as a

A:

Yes.

Q: Do you feel you ar^ a fit and
proper person to have the care| custody and
control of the minor children?
A:

Yes, I do.

Q: You have mentioned thfct there are
some racing activities.
Tell Inae about the
racing activities and how that i|s engaged in
within your family unit?
A: My three boys are involved in a
racing program where they go every weekend,
and the reason they go every weekend is
because they accumulate points. That is one
reason.
Another
reason
i&
for
the
experience of racing.
They become better
racers each time they go.
Q: Is this an activity ofj which both
you and your husband have approved for the
children?
A:

Yes.

Q: And one that you desire to continue
in the future?
A:

Yes.

At the conclusion of the evidence, by stipulation, the Court
examined the two oldest children outside Of the presence of the
parties and counsel, at the request of Plaintiff's counsel at
pages 409 and 410 of the record:
MR.
BROWN: We
would
request
specifically, because of the influence that
we think this man has, particularly with his
children, that the Court interview the
children today. . . . I think that if the
Court were to make some polite) inquiries
into some of the areas relative to the
contested areas of testimony that the Court
would have a great revelation to *+•

-21-

•

*

*

THE COURT: The two oldest boys the
Court would agree in talking to.
After

examining

the children, apparently the children were

again examined by the Trial Court.

However, the Trial Court

specifically held at pages 288 and 289:
As to the objection paragraph numbered 3, it
is true that the court examined the two
oldest sons on two separate occasions prior
to entering its decision; however, the court
had made its determination of custody before
examining the children the second time and
confirmed with the two young men that such
arrangements as set forth in the decree
would be satisfactory with them as the court
felt it was in their best interests to have
such arrangement of joint custody.
The only testimony from Defendant about custody is
found at page 390 wherein Defendant testified:
Q: You have physical custody of your
two sons, Aaron and Marlow James, is that
correct?
A:

That is correct.

Q: You have had custody of those two
children since when?
A: I think it was probably the month
of August.
Q: And your
two children?
A:

relationship with those

A very good one.

Q: What would you request that the
Court do with regard to the custody of those
children?
A: I would like those children left in
my custody.
-22-

Q: Do you believe they wlould like to
be in your custody?
A:

I do.

There is some indication that the Defendant has been
physically abusive to the minor children

(R. 357) and that

Defendant has made various promises to the children if they
will come and live with him (R. 355-357)^

The Trial Court did

not abuse the constitutional rights of pefendant.

The Court

simply, as per stipulation, interviewed the children and gave
weight to their desires,

POINT IV
THERE IS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION JN REQUIRING
DEFENDANT TO GIVE PLAINTIFF tHE RIVIERA
AUTOMOBILE•
The analysis heretofore contained} in this brief of the
distribution of the property of the marital estate discloses no
abuse in the award.
The testimony which was unrebutt^d was that Defendant
sold Plaintifffs vehicle which was previously paid
Plaintiff.

for by

The Riviera was the replacement vehicle for her

prior automobile.

It is obvious that Defendant plays fast and

loose with titles to vehicles when it flits his needs.
example, Plaintiff testified at page 387:
A: Yes. When he came and ^sked me if
he could sell my Cordoba that l! had paid
for, I told him he would not be able to sell
it without my consent. I saidf "The car is
not for sale. It's just what I wpit. It's
-23-

For

paid for. It's not for sale." And he said
he was going to sell it anyway. And I saidf
"You can't because I have the title." And
he aidf "No, you don't. It has always been
with Painter Motor Company."
Q: So even though you had paid for the
car it was titled in Painter Motor?
A:

Yes.

Defendant testified at page 377:
Q: Now Mrs. Painter is driving a Buick
Riviera, is that correct?
A:

That is correct.

Q:

Who owns that vehicle?

A:

Painter Motor Company.

Q: Have
you made
demand
on Mrs.
Painter in your capacity as a representative
of Painter Motor for the return of that
vehicle?
A:

I have.

Q: Is that car going to be awarded to
you some way or do you own it and it's just
titled in Painter Motor?
A: The car is not titled. It is still
in inventory.
I don't own the car.
The
Motor Company owns the car.
The Trial Court, in making the property distribution,
the

award

of

alimony

and

child

support,

looked

at

the

respective parties' earning capacities and the actualities of
the respective parties' capabilities.
earning

substantially

Defendant was obviously

more than he declared.

He

maneuvered assets between himself and Painter Motor.

-24-

constantly
His "self

dealings11 did not mislead the Trial Court and there is no
showing,

nor

can

there

be

any

showing,

of

an

abuse

of

discretion by the Trial Court.

POINT V
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORN^'S FEES AND
COSTS.
Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs for
the necessary defense of this appeal. , The case should be
remanded for an award of a reasonable fee| and costs.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion.

The

record reflects substantial evidence in support of the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the cgse should be affirmed
in

its

entirety

reasonable

with

attorney's

a

remand

fee

for

for

a determination

Plaintiff

in defending

of a
this

appeal.

DATED this ^ 2

day of December, 1987r
JARDINE, LrNEBAUGH, BRO^ft & DUNN

JAM!
Attorneysffor PlaintiffRespondent
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